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NOTES
discretionary and that before granting it, the court must balance
the respective interests involved. This case can be readily dis-
tinguished from the encroaching wall cases. While the remedy
that the owner of the land has against the possessor in bad faith is
fully set out in Article 508 of the Civil Code,16 Article 66017 does
not provide the remedy that the owner .of the estate below has
against the proprietor of the estate above who renders the natural
servitude more burdensome. Again, in Young v. International
Paper Comapny'8 the court refused to enjoin the defendant from
polluting a certain stream, when the evidence showed that the
plaintiff could be properly compensated in damages and that the
granting of an injunction would subject the defendant to great
expenses, disproportionate to the rather insignificant benefits
which the plaintiff would receive. From these cases it may be
concluded that the Louisiana courts will be ready to "balance the
equities" in cases that demand it and where the rights of the re-
spective parties are not fully covered by express provisions of the
Civil Code.
R.R.A.
INDUCING BREACH OF CONTRACT-DAMAGEs-Plaintiff, a mem-
ber of the Hospitality and Service Bureau of New Orleans which
brought customers from city newcomers to clients of the organi-
zation, filed an action against a third party defendant for inducing
her co-partner to breach her contract of partnership with plain-
tiff. The court held for the defendant saying, "It is now well
settled that one who is not a party to a contract is not liable in
damages to one of the parties to the contract for inducing the
other party to breach the contract."' Cust v. Item Company, 8 So.
(2d) 361 (La. 1942).
At common law, protection is given the interest of an indi-
vidual in his contractual relations and in the fulfilment thereof,
16. Supra note 1.
17. Supra note 15.
18. 179 La. 803, 155 So. 231 (1934).
1. The only loss alleged to have resulted directly from the breach was
the loss of six customers whose patronage was said to have been worth
$105.00 a month. The court said that all other items of damage (certain trav-
eling expenses in returning to rearrange the business, living expenses while
In New Orleans, and also certain medical expenses incurred in treating her
illness which she alleges was caused by the breach) would be too remote to
justify a recovery by the plaintiff, even if the law of Louisiana permitted a
party to the contract to recover damages from a third party for his inducing
the other party to breach the contract.
1942]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. V
because of the public policy involved in the security of transac-
tions. 2 Generally this protection is available only against the
other party to the contract and is not of such character as to be
available against third persons. 3 However, when a third party
maliciously induces the breach or interferes with the perform-
ance of a contract or uses physical force to accomplish the breach,
there may be an actionable tort.4
In the United States there is a conflict among the authorities
and the cases as to whether a contract terminable at will should
be treated different from the ordinary contract. Some courts say
that the fact that the employment was not for a fixed period but
merely at the will of the parties has no effect upon the right of
action,5 while others say that no action lies unless the method of
interference is in itself tortious. 6 Most of the cases, however, are
committed to the general view that such contracts should be
treated as ordinary contracts, though somewhat less protection is
given.'
Until the monumental case of Lumley v. Gye,8 the English
courts had allowed damages only against third parties inducing
a breach of contract where there was seduction, beating, or entic-
2. Harper, A Treatise on the Law of Torts (1933) 472, § 227.
Compare Louisiana cases which say that the law protects the business
by which a man gains a livelihood as sacredly as it does his life, and an un-
lawful interference with that business subjects the party injuring the busi-
ness to damages. Graham v. St. Charles Street Railroad Co., 47 La. Ann. 1657,
18 So. 707 (1895).
3. Harper, loc. cit. supra note 2.
4. Id. at 476-478, § 229; Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts (1941)
986-990.
5. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Millonas, 206 Ala. 147, 149, 89
So. 732, 735 (1921); Prosser, op. cit. supra note 4, at 981-982, § 104; Carpenter,
Interference with Contract Relations (1928) 41 Harv. L. Rev. 743; Smith, Cru-
cial Issues in Labor Litigation (1907) 20 Harv. L. Rev. 253, 261. See also
Johnston Harvester Co. v. Meinhardt, 9 Abb. N.C. 393, 397 (N.Y. S.Ct. 1880).
6. Harper, op. cit. supra note 2, at 474-475, § 228; Sayre, Inducing Breach
of Contract (1923) 36 Harv. L. Rev. 663, 700 ("To extend the doctrine of
Lumley v. Gye to cover cases where no breach of contract has taken place
would be as preposterous as it would be unjust."). For cases upholding this
view, see Harper, supra, at 475, n. 14.
7. McGuire v. Gerstley, 26 App. C. C. 193 (1905), affirmed 204 U.S. 489, 27
S.Ct. 332, 51 L.Ed. 581 (1907); Harley and Land Corp. v. Murray Rubber Co.,
31 F.(2d) 932 (C.C.A. 2d, 1929), cert. denied 219 U.S. 872, 49 S.Ct. 513, 73 L.Ed.
1007 (1928). Prosser, op. cit. supra note 4, at 981, § 104.
"The interest of labor unions in advancing the interests of their members
will justify interference with contracts of employment terminable at will,
where the object sought is clearly connected with the immediate benefit of
the workmen; but the tendency has been to deny any such privilege where
the connection is more remote or indirect." Prosser, op. cit. supra, at 972,
1001-1011. Where the contract is for a definite period, the unions are given
even less right to interfere. Id. at 1002.
8. 2 El. & Bl. 216, 118 Eng. Reprint 749 (1853); Bohlen, Cases on Torts
(3 ed. 1927) 934.
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ing, and where the party who breached was a menial or domestic
servant.9 That case extended the old doctrine to include all con-
tracts of service. The doctrine thus announced, that intentional
interference with a contract may be an actionable tort, was re-
ceived at first with hesitation; but later affirmed in Bowen v.
Hall.10 It was extended in Temperton v. Russell" to include inter-
ference with the performance of a contract for other than per-
sonal service. The great majority of American courts have not
accepted this rule as applied to all contracts. 2 A dwindling mi-
nority refuse its application to interference with relations other
than that of master and servant. 13
Interference with contract has remained almost entirely an
intentional tort, and liability has not been extended generally to
the various forms of negligence by which performance of a con-
tract may be prevented or rendered more burdensome. 14
Once the intentional interference with the contract is found,
liability usually turns on the purpose or object for which the
breach was induced, and the burden of proving justification or
privilege is with the defendant. 5 In Lumley v. Gye great stress
9. Harper, op. cit. supra note 2, at 473, § 227.
10. 6 Q.B.D. 333 (1881). See Sayre, supra note 6, at 669.
11. [1893] 1 Q.B. 715. See Sayre, supra note 6, at 670.
12. A large number of cases can be found collected in the notes in (1908)
11 L.R.A. (N.S.) 202; (1908) 16 L.R.A. (N.S.) 746; (1910) 28 L.R.A. (N.S.) 615;
(1915) L.R.A. 1915F, 1076. For illustrative American cases, see Employing
Printers' Club v. Doctor Blosser Co., 122 Ga. 509, 50 S.E. 353 (1905); Doremus
v. Heunessy, 176 Ill. 608, 52 N.E. 924 (1898); London Guarantee & Accident
Co. v. Horn, 206 Ill. 493, 69 N.E. 526 (1903). See also Sayre, supra note 6, at
671 (1923).
13. Boyson v. Thorn, 98 Cal. 578, 33 Pac. 492 (1893); Chambers v. Baldwin,
91 Ky. 121, 15 S.W. 57 (1891); Boulier v. Macauley, 91 Ky. 135, 15 S.W. 60
(1891). See also Glencoe Sand and Gravel Co. v. Hudson Brothers Comm. Co.,
138 Mo. 439, 40 S.W. 93 (1897) (doctrine rejected except where the relation of
master and servant exists).
14. Prosser, op. cit. supra note 4, at 991, § 104.
15. Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194, 25 S.Ct. 3, 49 L.Ed. 154 (1904); Con-
nors v. Connolly, 86 Conn. 641, 86 Atl. 600, 45 L.R.A. (N.S.) 564 (1913); Berry
v. Donovan, 188 Mass. 353, 74 N.E. 603, 5 L.R.A. (N.S.) 899, 108 Am. St. Rep.
499, 3 Ann. Cas. 738 (1905); DeMinico v. Craig, 207 Mass. 593, 94 N.E. 317, 42
L.R.A. (N.S.) 1048 (1911).
At common law the defendant is extended the privilege to interfere with
relations in the following instances:
(1) To protect or exercise an existing property interest;
(2) To exercise a "civil," "legal," or "general" right;
(8) To protect the interests of another individual;
(4) To protect the general health and morals of the community;
(5) To acquire property by fair means, i. e., the privilege of competition;
(6) To advance the interests of an economic group, a social group, or an
institution recognized as desirable by society. Comment (1932) 17 Corn. L. Q.
509.
"It may be true that even with the use of categories the whole problem
will remain fundamentally a question of balancing interests. Yet this does
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was laid on the element of "malice," which was said to be requi-
site to sustain the action. No satisfactory definition of "malice"
was given. In the last analysis it is a purely mental element, and
consists of the intention to appropriate for oneself the promised
advantages which another has secured by contract."" It may seem
harsh to decide these cases upon the thin line of motive; but in
other instances in the law of torts, where the conflicting interests
are as evenly balanced 'as here, examination of the defendant's
motive has been justly resorted to.1 7
The court's statement in the principal case that "one who is
not a party to a contract is not liable in damages to one of the
parties to the contract for inducing the other party to breach the
contract" '18 must be read in the light of a multitude of Louisiana
decisions in point. Careful analysis of these cases reveals the fact
that the results reached in Louisiana are substantially in accord
with those reached in a majority of the common law states in
this country. Louisiana courts have broadly stated that the action
for damages against the third party will not be permitted be-
cause a business man has no right to be protected from fair com-
petition.19 However, this rule has been limited by a number of
exceptions found in the case of threats, fraud, falsehood, decep-
tion, benefit, actual physical violence, or malice.20
not obviate the fact that if the interests that lead the court to their final
results are set down, and carefully calculated, there will at least be signposts
leading out of the bog that the doctrine at present seems to be in." Id. at 522.
16. Harper, op. cit. supra note 2, at 476-477, § 229 ("The somewhat ques-
tion begging formula often used is the 'intentional doing of a wrongful act,
without legal justification or excuse.'"); Sayre, supra note 6, at 675, 702.
17. See Pollock, Torts (8 ed. 1934) 314 (law of malicious prosecution);
267 (questions of privilege as a defense for slander); 307-308 (slander of title
cases); Sayre, supra note 6, at 679 (in many cases of evenly balanced inter-
ests).
18. Cust v. Item Co., 8 So.(2d) 261, 363 (La. 1942).
19. Orr v. Home Mutual Insurance Co., 12 La. Ann. 255 (1857); Graham v.
St. Charles Street Railroad Co., 47 La. Ann. 1656, 18 So. 707, 49 Am. St. Rep.
436 (1895); Lewis v. Huie-Hodge Lumber Co., 121 La. 658, 46 So. 685 (1908);
Gilly v. Hirsh, 122 La. 966, 48 So. 422, 20 L.R.A. (N.S.) 972 (1909); McGee v.
Collins, 156 La. 291, 100 So. 430 (1924); Deon v. Kirby Lumber Co., 162 La. 671,
111 So. 55, 52 A.L.R. 1023 (1926); Hartman v. Greene, 193 La. 234, 190 So. 390
(1939), cert. denied 308 U.S. 612, 60 S.Ct. 180, 84 L.Ed. 512 (1939).
Where a merchant undersells or oversells his neighbor or carries on other
lawful competition, even though his neighbor be injured thereby, it is said
that his injury, being the result of lawful competition, is damnum absque
injuria and damages are not allowed. See Orr v. Home Mutual Insurance Co.,
Gilly v. Hirsh, and Deon v. Kirby Lumber Co., supra.
When a privileged communication or publication occasions breach of con-
tract, damages will not be allowed against such publisher. See Richardson v.
Cooke, 129 La. 365, 56 So. 318 (1911).
20. Fenner v. Watkins, 16 La. 204 (1840) (unauthorized opposition against
authorized ferry); Orr v. Home Mutual Insurance Co., 12 La. Ann. 255 (1857)
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Act 50 of 189221 is a criminal statute which provides in Sec-
tion 2 that the third person inducing breach of contract shall be
fined and shall be liable in a civil action double the amount of
damages which such employer or landlord may suffer by such
abandonment. In Kline v. Eubank2 2 it was held that the civil
action provided by that statute would not lie until after the crim-
inal conviction.2 3 With reference to the argument that there was
an independent civil action under the general provision in Article
2315 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 ("every act whatever of
a person which causes injury to another obliges him by whose
fault it happened to repair it"), the court held that employing a
laborer already employed by another person would not create a
(case dismissed because of failure to find malice); Dickson v. Dickson, 33 La.
Ann. 1261 (1881) (threats and inducement gave right to damages); Graham
v. St. Charles Street Railroad Co., 47 La. Ann. 1656, 18 So. 707, 49 Am. St. Rep.
436 (1895) (threats occasioned damage); Kilne v. Eubanks, 109 La. 241, 33 So.
211 (1902) (neither malice nor fraud charged, action not maintainable);
Wolfe and Sons v. New Orleans Tailor-Made Pants Co., 113 La. 388, 37 So. 2,
67 L.R.A. 65 (1904) (no cause or right of action where ignorance of previous
contract); Lewis v. Huie-Hodge Lumber Co., 121 La. 658, 46 So. 685 (1908)(malice and threats were not made out and case dismissed); Gilly v. Hirsh,
122 La. 966, 48 So. 422, 20 L.R.A. (N.S.) 972 (1909) (molesting of customers
properly enjoined); Sandlin v. Coyle, 143 La. 121, 78 So. 261, L.R.A. 1918D 389
(1918) (acts of violence gave right to damages); McGee v. Collins, 156 La. 291,
100 So. 430 (1924) (malicious or otherwise improper motive not found, hence
dismissed); Deon v. Kirby Lumber Co., 162 La. 671, 111 So. 55, 52 A.L.R.
1023 (1926) (malice not made out and case dismissed); Carson v. Stephens,
14 La. App. 272, 129 So. 381 (1930) (threats entitled plaintiff to damages);
Walsh v. New Orleans Cotton Exchange, 188 La. 338, 177 So. 68 (1937) (motive
not examined when rules of cotton exchange followed). See also Hartman v.
Greene, 193 La. 234, 190 So. 390 (1939), cert. denied 308 U.S. 612, 60 S.Ct. 180,
84 L.Ed. 512 (1939).
In the celebrated case of Moulin v. Monteleone, 165 La. 169, 115 So. 447
(1927), damages were disallowed against defendant who persuaded plaintiff's
wife to breach her contract by violating her marriage vow. It was suggested
that some remedy should be provided but that the best means of suppressing
such action would be by a penal statute rather than by allowing damages.
This is the general common law rule also. See Comment (1932) 17 Corn.
L. Q. 509.
21. This act was repealed by Act 54 of 1906 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 4384-
4386], but Section 2 dealing with interference with contractual relations was
left substantially the same as in the old act with the same penalty for viola-
tion. Section 3 makes it a misdemeanor to "falsely or fraudulently cause the
arrest of, or otherwise unlawfully defame a hired person, tenant or share-
hand, who has not violated the contract, or after its expiration."
Article 2750 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 fixes the damages as
between the laborer and his employer when the laborer leaves his employ
before the time of his engagement has expired, but it has been held that this
article has no application in a suit for damages against a third party. Wolfe
& Sons v. New Orleans Tailor-Made Pants Co., 113 La. 388, 37 So. 2, 67 L.R.A.
65 (1904).
22. 109 La. 241, 33 So. 211 (1902).
23. It was further said that It was a matter of common knowledge that
this act applies only to agricultural laborers and tenants and should not be
given general application to all contracts. Wolfe & Sons v. New Orleans
Tailor-Made Pants Co., 113 La. 388, 394, 37 So. 2, 5, 67 L.R.A. 65, 70 (1904).
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liability on the part of the one employing him, unless it was done
with some degree of fraud or malice.
The general Louisiana rule announced by Chief Justice
O'Niell in the principal case, read in the light of its established
exceptions, is an equitable disposition of the conflict of interests
presented when the court is called upon to consider the interest
of one individual in the security of transactions and, at the same
time, the interest of another individual in the right to free com-
petition. Summed up, our present rule can be stated as follows:
One who is not a party to a contract is not liable in damages to
one of the parties to the contract for inducing the other party to
breach the contract, except when unlawful force or some definite
degree of fraud or malice is present.
W. F. M. M., JR.
MINERAL RIGHTS-GRAVEL NOT INCLUDED IN MINERAL RESERVA-
TION-INTENTION OF PARTIES TEST APPLIED-By an act of sale the
defendant acquired from the plaintiffs the land in question sub-
ject to a reservation in the deed in favor of the plaintiff-vendor
of nine-twentieths of all "the mineral, oil and gas rights." Com-
mercial deposits of gravel were found on the tract and the plain-
tiffs seek to recover their share alleging that gravel was included
in the mineral reservation. Held, the parties in drawing up the
deed did not intend to reserve the gravel deposits in the deed.
Holloway Gravel Company, Incorporated v. McKowen, 9 So. (2d)
228 (La. 1942).
The court in the instant case was eminently correct in the
application of the intention of the parties theory,' since the ques-
tion as to whether or not gravel is a mineral 2 is a difficult, if not
1. Although the Louisiana court has never been called upon to decide
whether or not sand and gravel are included in the general term "mineral
rights," a few indications of their instinctive reaction to the meaning of the
term are listed. In the case of Logan v. State Gravel Co., 158 La. 105, 110,
103 So. 526, 528 (1925), in which a contract to remove gravel was held to be
a lease, the court said, "We have an example of a lease of lands for mining
(or quarrying) purposes ... ," thus indicating that in the minds of the justices
there is a distinct difference between mining and quarrying. In the case
of Gonzales v. Watson, 162 La. 1048, 1053, 111 So. 416, 418 (1927) the court,
in speaking of the legislature's idea in defining a real estate broker, said "It
[the legislature] did not have in contemplation gravel or mineral leases."
Here the court signifies by the use of the disjunctive "or" that gravel and
minerals fall into definitely separate categories. Article 552 of the Louisiana
Civil Code of 1870 uses both the term "mines" and the term "quarries."
2. It is interesting to note that the federal income tax law has included
gravel in the broad term "minerals" dealing with the deductions from the
gross income by means of depletion. C.C.H. 1942 Fed. Tax. Serv. 1923 (m-d).
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